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THE EFFECT OF COOPERATIVES ON PRODUCT INNOVATION IN 
THE AGRI-FOOD SYSTEM 
 
Abstract - This paper develops a game-theoretic model of heterogeneous consumers to analyze the effect 
of cooperative involvement on quality-enhancing product innovation activity, the pricing of food 
products, and the welfare of the groups involved in the context of a mixed duopoly where an open-
membership consumer co-op competes with an IOF. Analytical results show that the involvement of the 
member welfare-maximizing co-op in R&D can be quality and welfare enhancing by increasing the 
arrival rate of product innovations and reducing the prices of food products. The effectiveness of the co-
op is shown to depend on the nature of product differentiation and the relative quality of its products, the 
degree of consumer heterogeneity, and the size of innovation costs. 
 
Keywords: cooperatives, product innovation, mixed oligopoly, retained earnings. 
 
Research and development (R&D) is a critical business strategy affecting the competitiveness of firms, 
technological change, and social welfare. Innovation activity has become particularly relevant in the 
increasingly industrialized agri-food sector where changes in consumer preferences and global 
competition have resulted in aggressive attempts by agribusiness firms to satisfy market demands for 
higher quality products through innovation and product differentiation strategies. 
  The strategic interactions among innovating firms and their effect on innovating behavior have 
received considerable attention in the economic literature with the main focus being on R&D competition 
in a pure oligopoly (i.e., a small number of profit-maximizing, investor-owned firms (IOFs)), and the 
consequence of this competition for the structure of the market and the arrival rate of innovations.
1 
Despite the prevalence of mixed markets where cooperatives (co-ops) compete alongside IOFs,
2 
the effect of cooperative organizations on product innovation activity has not been considered 
previously.
3 The only study considering the effect of cooperatives on innovation is Giannakas and Fulton  
(2005) that focused on the effect of input supplying co-ops on cost-reducing, process innovation activity.  
                                                 
1 See Fudenberg et al (1983), Grossman and Shapiro (1987), Aoki (1991), Delbono (1993), Malueg and Tsutsui 
(1997), and Sutton (1998). For Schumpeterian models of innovation competition see Segerstrom, Avant, and 
Dinopoulos (1990), and Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998).  
2 Co-ops account for 25% to 30% of total farm supply and marketing expenditures in the US (USDA, 2003). 
3 The literature on mixed oligopolies involving co-ops has focused on the effect of different types of cooperative 
organizations on the equilibrium conditions of various Cournot and Bertrand market settings (see Sexton and Sexton 
(1987), Cotterill (1987), Sexton (1990), Tennbakk (1995), Albaek and Schultz (1998), Fulton and Giannakas (2001), 
Karantininis and Zago (2001)). A key result of this literature is that the different objective function of the co-op 
results in more competitive conduct and increased welfare.   2
Part of the reason for this lack of research is that co-ops have not traditionally played a major role 
in quality-enhancing, product innovation activity. Indeed, the standard view has been that co-ops are 
largely concentrated in the vertical stages just before and just after the farm enterprise. While co-ops are 
still largely concentrated near the farm gate, a number of them are taking steps to position themselves via 
their innovation activity. Important examples include Limagrain, Cebeco, and Cosun in Europe, while co-
ops in the U.S. such as Ocean Spray have had substantial R&D activity.
4 
The objective of this paper is to examine the market and welfare effects of cooperative 
involvement in quality-enhancing innovation activity in the agri-food system. In particular, the paper 
analyzes the consequences of cooperative involvement for the arrival rate of (quality-enhancing) product 
innovations, the pricing behavior of firms, and social welfare in the context of a mixed duopoly where an 
open-membership consumer co-op competes with an IOF. By focusing on a mixed oligopoly, the study 
pays particular attention to the impact of replacing a profit-maximizing IOF with a member welfare-
maximizing co-op. The case of a pure oligopoly is also analyzed and is used as a benchmark for 
determining the consequences of cooperative involvement in quality-enhancing R&D. Different scenarios 
on the type of product differentiation (horizontal versus vertical product differentiation
5) and the relative 
quality of the products supplied by the firms in the vertically differentiated mixed and pure duopolies are 
examined within this framework.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodological framework 
and the main assumptions of our analysis. The three sections following analyze the cases where: the 
products supplied by the firms are horizontally differentiated (Section 3), the products are vertically 
differentiated and the co-op is the high quality firm (Section 4), and the products are vertically 
                                                 
4 The example of Ocean Spray provides a good illustration of the different types of innovation activity in which 
firms can engage. Product innovation is reflected in the development of new markets for cranberries – e.g., the 
mixed cranberry drinks such as Cran Apple and the dried cranberry Craisins. Ocean Spray’s Ingredient Technology 
Group, which works with its customers to develop innovative fruit ingredients, is another example of R&D activity 
in product innovation.  
5 Products are horizontally differentiated when they are not uniformly ranked by consumers – if offered at the same 
price, all products will enjoy positive shares of the market. Vertically differentiated products are those that are 
uniformly quality ranked by consumers – if offered at the same price all consumers will prefer the same (high 
quality) product.    3
differentiated and the co-op is the low quality firm (Section 5). Within each of these three sections, the 
equilibrium conditions in the pure and mixed oligopolies are derived and compared to determine the 
effect of cooperative involvement on quality-enhancing product innovation activity, the prices of the food 
products, firm profits, and consumer welfare. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Methodological Framework 
To analyze the effect of cooperative involvement in quality-enhancing product innovation activity our 
study follows the approach developed by Giannakas and Fulton (2005) (G&F, hereafter) when examining 
the effect of input supplying co-ops on cost-reducing, process innovation activity. In particular, the 
strategic interaction between the firms in the pure and the mixed duopolies is modeled as a three-stage 
sequential game where: in stage 1, the firms compete in prices and a new product innovation that can 
enhance the quality of their offerings is announced; in stage 2, the firms determine their optimal level of 
investment in the new quality-enhancing innovation; and in stage 3, quality levels are fixed and the firms 
engage in price competition. In what follows, stage 1 will often be referred to as the “pre-innovation 
stage,” stage 2 as the “innovation stage,” and stage 3 as the “post-innovation stage.”  
To avoid Nash equilibria involving non-credible strategies, the different formulations of the game 
are solved using backward induction (Gibbons, 1992) – the pricing behavior of the firms at the post-
innovation stage is considered first, the optimal investment in the quality-enhancing innovation is 
analyzed next, and the solution to the pre-innovation pricing problem determines the subgame perfect 
equilibrium amount of R&D, the pricing of the food products, and consumer decisions in the pre- and 
post-innovation stages.  
In addition to being intuitively appealing, this structure of the strategic interaction in the mixed 
oligopoly enables us to explicitly account for the different objective function of the co-op (member 
welfare maximization vs. profit maximization pursued by IOFs) as well as for the need of the co-op to 
rely on earnings raised at the pre-innovation stage to finance its subsequent investment in quality-
enhancing innovation (on the difficulties of open membership co-ops to raise investment capital and the   4
role of retained earnings in addressing various property rights problems see G&F and the references 
therein). Other than facilitating the explicit consideration of these important idiosyncrasies of the 
cooperative organization, this structure of strategic interactions makes our results directly comparable to 
those of G&F. Given that both the input-supplying co-op analyzed in G&F and the consumer co-op 
considered here constitute a backward integration of their members (they are both selling their products to 
their members), a comparison of our results with those of G&F will enable us to determine whether the 
type of innovation (i.e., product vs. process innovation) matters when considering the effect of 
cooperative involvement in innovation activity.   
 
3. Horizontal Product Differentiation 
Before examining the pricing and innovation decisions in the pure and mixed oligopolies, we need to 
analyze the way consumers make their purchasing decisions. By doing so, we will be able to derive the 
demands faced by each firm and obtain a measurement of consumer surplus. 
3.1. Consumer Decisions and Welfare 
Consider first the case where the products supplied by Firm I and Firm C are horizontally differentiated – 
i.e., the food products are not uniformly quality ranked by consumers so that, if they were offered at the 
same price, they would both enjoy positive shares of the market. Consumers buy one unit of either the 
product supplied by Firm I or the product supplied by Firm C. The purchasing decision represents a small 
share of their budget and, due to different tastes or location (i.e., physical distance from the two firms), 
consumers differ in their valuation of these products. We will distinguish between consumer decisions 
made in stages 1 and 3 since the quality-enhancing innovation affects the consumer utility at the post-
innovation stage of the game. 
 
Consumer Decisions and Welfare in Stage 1 (Prior to the Quality-Enhancing Innovation) 
As mentioned previously, consumers have to decide between the product of Firm I and the product of 
Firm C and, due to different tastes or location, they differ in the valuation of these products. Let  [0,1] α ∈    5
be the attribute that differentiates consumers. A consumer with attribute α has the following utility 




(1)                        If a unit of Firm C's product is consumed










where  (1) C U  and  (1) I U  is the utility associated with the unit consumption of the product supplied by Firm 
C and Firm I, respectively;  (1) C p  and  (1) I p  are the pre-innovation prices of these products; and  1 U  is a 
base level of utility associated with the unit consumption of these products that is common across 
consumers. The parameter μ is non-negative and captures the degree of consumer heterogeneity. Ceteris 
paribus, consumers with large values of α prefer the product of Firm C, while consumers with low values 
of α prefer the product of Firm I. The greater is μ, the greater the differences in consumer valuation of the 
two products. 
To ensure positive market shares for the two firms, it is assumed that μ is greater than the 
difference in the prices of the two products (see equations (3) and (4)), while, to retain tractability of the 
model, the analysis assumes that consumers are uniformly distributed between the polar values of α. Each 
consumer buys only one product with the purchasing decision being determined by the relationship 
between  (1) C U  and  (1) I U . 
  Figure 1 shows the decisions and welfare of consumers. The downward sloping curve shows the 
utility associated with the consumption of the product of Firm I, while the upward sloping curve shows 
the utility associated with the consumption of the product of Firm C for different values of the 
differentiating attribute α (i.e., for different consumers). The intersection of the two utility curves 
determines the level of the differentiating attribute that corresponds to the indifferent consumer. The 
consumer with differentiating characteristic  (1) I α  given by: 
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(1) (1)
(1)
(2)      : 1
         
2
IC I C I
CI
I
U U Up Up
pp




== > −+ = −+ − = >
+−
=
   6
is indifferent between buying from Firm I and buying from Firm C as the utility associated with the 
consumption of the two products is the same. Consumers with  (1) [0, ) I α α ∈  buy from Firm I while 
consumers with  (1) (, 1 ] I α α ∈  buy from Firm C. Aggregate consumer surplus is given by the area 
underneath the effective utility curve shown as the (bold dashed) kink curve in Figure 1. 
When consumers are uniformly distributed with respect to their differentiating attribute α,  (1) I α  
also determines the market share of Firm I. The share of Firm C is given by  (1) 1 I α − . By normalizing the 
mass of consumers at unity, the market shares give the consumer demands faced by Firm I,  (1) I x , and 
Firm C,  (1) C x . Formally,  (1) I x  and  (1) C x  can be written as:  
(1) (1)






















Consumer Decisions and Welfare in Stage 3 (After the Quality-Enhancing Innovation) 
The quality-enhancing product innovation undertaken by the two firms in stage 2 affects the quality of the 
firms’ products and, therefore, it affects the utility associated with their consumption. To retain 
tractability, we assume that the amount of innovation undertaken by Firm i ({ , } iC I ∈ ) affects the base 
level of utility associated with the consumption of its product so that the post-innovation base utility 
becomes: 
31 (5)     
i
ii UU t β =+  
where  i t  is the amount of innovation effort by Firm i. The parameter  i β  represents the effectiveness of 
innovation effort by Firm i and it is normalized to one. In addition to simplifying our exposition, 
imposing symmetry on the effectiveness of firms’ innovation efforts allows us to focus on the effect that 
the different objective function of the co-op has on equilibrium innovation and pricing decisions. 




(6)                        If a unit of Firm C's product is consumed










where  (3) C p  and  (3) I p  are the post-innovation prices of Firm C’s and Firm I’s products, respectively. All 
other variables are as previously defined.  
The post-innovation consumer decisions and welfare are depicted in Figure 2. Similar to the pre-
innovation case, the indifferent consumer is identified by the intersection of the utility curves associated 
with the consumption of the two products, i.e.,  
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After determining the demands for the two products at the pre- and post-innovation stages, we will now 
proceed to deriving the subgame perfect equilibria in the pure and mixed oligopolies. 
  
3.2. Benchmark Case: Innovation and Pricing Decisions in a Pure Oligopoly 
Price Competition at the Post-Innovation Stage (3
rd Stage of the Game) 
In the post-innovation stage of the pure duopoly, the two IOFs seek to determine the prices that maximize 
their profits holding Nash conjectures (i.e., assuming that their decisions will not affect the behavior of 
their rival).
6 Specifically, the problem of the two IOFs at the 3
rd stage of the game can be expressed as: 
( )
(3)




p cx Π= −  
where c is firms’ marginal cost of production.
7 In addition to simplifying our exposition, the imposition of  
                                                 
6 The assumption of Nash conjectures is maintained throughout the analysis. 
7 Note that the costs of production are not affected by the quality-enhancing innovation activity. Product innovation 
is taking place in stage 2 and is financed through a sunk investment occurring at that stage.   8
symmetry on the costs of production allows us to isolate the effect of the different objective function of 
the co-op in the mixed oligopoly case.   
  Solving the problem of the two IOFs gives their best response functions as: 
() (3) (3)
1
    
2
ij i j p cp t t μ =+ + + −  
where { , }  and  jC I ij ∈≠ . Solving these best response functions simultaneously and substituting  
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and are a function of the degree of consumer heterogeneity and the amount of quality-enhancing 
innovation undertaken by each IOF. Ceteris paribus, the greater the innovation effort of a firm, the 
greater its market share, and the greater its profits at the post-innovation stage of the game. 
 
Innovation Competition (2
nd Stage of the Game) 
In stage 2, the two IOFs seek to determine their optimal innovation effort. While, as indicated by equation 
(13), innovation effort has the potential to increase the post-innovation profits of a firm, quality-
enhancing innovation requires resources. Without loss of generality, innovation costs are assumed an 
increasing function of the innovation effort (Shy), i.e.,  
2 1
(14)     
2
i i It ψ =  
where ψ is a strictly positive scalar reflecting the size of innovation costs. 
  Thus, at the innovation stage of the game each IOF seeks to determine the innovation effort that 



















Π= −  
From the first order conditions for each IOF’s problem we obtain their best response function as: 
3












Solving the best response functions simultaneously, we get the Nash equilibrium levels of innovation for 
each firm as: 
* 1





Substituting the equilibrium levels of innovation in the expressions for innovation costs and post-












Price Competition at the Pre-Innovation Stage (1
st Stage of the Game) 
In this stage, the two Firms seek to determine the prices that maximize their profits. Since the firms’ 
payoffs in stages 2 and 3 are not dependent on pre-innovation prices or quantities, the  
objective of the two IOFs in stage 1 is to maximize their pre-innovation profits only, i.e.,  
()
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  Table 1 summarizes the subgame perfect equilibrium in the pure oligopoly. Since the two IOFs 
have the same cost structure, the same effectiveness of innovation effort, and their products are horizontally 
differentiated, the equilibrium is symmetric. Both firms undertake a positive innovation effort, enjoy a per  
unit profit margin of μ, and split the market equally in both the pre- and post-innovation stages of the game.   10
3.3. Innovation and Pricing Decisions in a Mixed Oligopoly 
In this case, Firm C is a co-op instead of an IOF. The market structure is, thus, a mixed duopoly 
consisting of an IOF (Firm I) and a co-op (Firm C). 
Price Competition at the Post-Innovation Stage 
Similar to the pure oligopoly case, at the 3
rd stage the IOF seeks to determine the price that maximizes its 
profits. Thus, both its objective function and its best response function are identical to those in the post-
innovation stage of the pure duopoly. 
Unlike Firm C in the pure oligopoly, the co-op seeks to identify the price that maximizes the 
welfare of its members (i.e., consumers that patronize its activities) subject to not incurring economic 
losses. Member welfare is given by the shadowed area  (3) MW  in Figure 2 and the cooperative’s problem 
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Note, that this objective function captures the open membership nature of the co-op since the latter seeks 
to maximize the welfare of all the consumers that patronize its activity. 
Solving the optimality conditions of co-op’s problem, shows that the co-op will find it optimal to 
price its product its marginal cost (i.e.,  (3) C p c = ).
8 The Nash equilibrium prices and quantities at the 
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8 It should be noted that marginal cost pricing will be the optimal strategy of the co-op at the post-innovation stage 
no matter if it seeks to maximize the welfare of all consumers that buy its product or the welfare of only a subset of 
its post-innovation membership. The obvious reason is that the welfare of any consumer group is inversely related to 





(26)     
3























(3) 1 (3) (3)
(28)     
8
(29)      0
1














=− + + −
 
 
Innovation Competition in the Mixed Oligopoly  
In this stage, the two Firms seek to determine their optimal innovation effort. Similar to the pure 
oligopoly case, the problem of the IOF is to determine the amount of innovation that maximizes its post-


















Π= Π − = −  
  On the other hand, the problem of the co-op is to maximize the welfare of consumers that are 
members at the time the decision to invest in innovation is being made (this group will be referred to as 
the “pre-innovation membership”). As will be shown below (in stage 1), the pre-innovation membership 
is the group that, by paying increased prices at the pre-innovation stage, provides the co-op with earnings 
that finance its subsequent quality-enhancing innovation effort. Thus, even though the co-op knows that 
its innovation activity can increase the relative quality of its product and attract new consumers/members 
to the co-op at the post-innovation stage, when making its innovation decisions it considers only the 
welfare of consumers that finance its innovation activity (by patronizing the co-op in stage 1).
9 
  Algebraically, the problem of the coop can be expressed as: 
                                                 
9 See G&F for a similar formulation of the input-supplying co-op’s objective function when determining its 
investment in cost-reducing, process innovation activity.   12
() (2,3)
'2 2
(3/1) 1 (1) (1)
11






MW MW IU c t x x t μ μψ =− = − + +− −  
where  (1) C x  is the share of the co-op in stage 1,  (2,3) MW  is the welfare of the pre-innovation membership 
in stages 2 and 3, and 
'
(3/1) MW  is the welfare of the pre-innovation membership in stage 3. Solving the 
problems of the co-op and the IOF, we get their best response functions as: 
(1) (33)     
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Price Competition at the Pre-Innovation Stage 
Unlike the pure oligopoly case, in the mixed duopoly the outcome of price competition in the pre-
innovation stage affects firms’ optimal decisions and payoffs in subsequent stages (see equations (35), 
(36), (38) and (39)). Thus, in stage 1 the IOF seeks to determine the price that maximizes its total profits   13
(i.e., its profits at the pre-innovation stage plus its profits at the post-innovation stage minus its innovation 
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The best response function of the IOF is: 
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  Regarding the co-op, its problem at this stage is to determine the price that maximizes the welfare 
of its pre-innovation membership in both the pre- and post-innovation stages of the game, subject to 
raising earnings that can be retained to finance its quality-enhancing innovation in stage 2. The capital 
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where  (1) MW  is the welfare of the pre-innovation membership in stage 1. The optimality conditions for 
the co-op’s optimization problem suggest that the co-op will find it optimal to choose its price such that 
the investment constraint binds, i.e., the co-op will price its product so that it raises exactly the amount of 
















The Nash equilibrium prices and quantities at the pre-innovation stage of the mixed oligopoly are 
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  Substituting the equilibrium pre-innovation membership of the co-op (equation (45)) in equations 
(35)-(37) gives the subgame perfect equilibrium innovation levels in the mixed duopoly. Substituting the 
new expressions of  I t  and  C t  into equations (24)-(30) gives the subgame perfect equilibrium prices and 
quantities in the post-innovation stage of the game.  
Table 2 summarizes the subgame perfect equilibrium in the mixed oligopoly. Note that, unlike the 
pure duopoly case, the subgame perfect equilibrium in the mixed oligopoly is asymmetric. The member-
welfare maximizing co-op charges lower prices both in the pre- and post-innovation stages of the game 
and invests more in quality-enhancing innovation than the IOF. The reason is that, due to its objective 
function, the co-op is better able to internalize the costs and benefits of innovation. 
Before concluding this section, it is important to point out that the lower the innovation costs 
and/or the less heterogeneous the consumers, the greater the market share of the co-op at the post-
innovation stage of the game. When 0.625 μψ < , the IOF will exit the market at the 3
rd stage of the game 
(i.e.,  (3) 0 I x = ) and the co-op will dominate the market (i.e.,  (3) 1 I x = ). The exit of the IOF in stage 3 
eliminates its incentives to innovate in stage 2 and, therefore, changes the equilibrium conditions in the 
mixed oligopoly. In this context, before comparing the subgame perfect equilibria in the pure and mixed 
oligopolies, it is important to consider the case where the co-op ends up being a monopolist at the post-
innovation stage of the game. 
   15
3.4. Innovation and Pricing Decisions when the Co-op is a Monopolist in Stage 3 
Price Competition at the Post-Innovation Stage 
Similar to the case examined previously, the objective of the co-op at the post-innovation stage is to 
maximize the welfare of its members without incurring financial losses. Since consumer welfare is 
inversely related to food product prices, the co-op will price its product at marginal cost and will 
dominate the market since, when  (3) C p = c and  0.625 μψ < , the IOF will find it optimal to exit the 
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Innovation Competition  
In this stage the two Firms determine their innovation efforts. Since the IOF’s post-innovation profits are 
zero, its optimization problem is equivalent to minimizing innovation costs. Of course, innovation costs 
are minimized when  0 I t = .   
  Regarding the co-op, its problem at the innovation stage of the game remains to identify the level 
of innovation that maximizes the welfare of its pre-innovation membership (i.e., consumers that 
patronized the co-op at the pre-innovation stage of the game), i.e.,   
() (2,3)
'' 2 2
(3/1) 1 (1) (1)
11
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Solving the maximization problem of the co-op, we get the Nash equilibrium level of innovation as:  
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Price Competition at the Pre-Innovation Stage  
In this stage the two Firms compete in prices. Since the IOF’s profits in stages 2 and 3 are zero (and thus, 
not dependent on the firm’s choices in stage 1), the problem of the IOF in stage 1 is to determine the price 
that maximizes its profits at the pre-innovation stage of the game, i.e., 
(1)





p cx Π= Π = −  
  Regarding the co-op, its payoff in stages 2 and 3 remains dependent on the size of its pre-innovation 
membership (i.e., (1) C x ) and, thus, it remains dependent on the outcome of the strategic interaction in stage 1. 
Thus, the co-op’s problem in stage 1 remains to determine the price that maximizes the welfare of its pre-
innovation membership in the pre- and post-innovation stages of the game subject to raising the capital 
required for the innovation activity in stage 2 (see equation (41)).  
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Substituting (60) into equation (53), we get the subgame perfect equilibrium level of innovation. 
Table 3 summarizes the subgame perfect equilibrium when 0.625 μψ < . The co-op charges lower pre-
innovation prices than the IOF, and is the sole player in stages 2 and 3. It is important to note that even 
though we observe a monopoly in stage 3, the equilibrium pricing is equivalent to the perfectly 
competitive one as the co-op seeks to maximize member welfare (and not profits).   17
3.5.  The Effect of Cooperative Involvement on Innovation Activity 
Having determined the subgame perfect equilibrium conditions in the pure and mixed oligopolies, we can 
now examine the ramifications of cooperative involvement for quality-enhancing innovation activity, pre- 
and post-innovation prices, and the welfare of the groups involved. We begin by considering the case 
where 0.625 μψ > . 
  Figure 3 graphs the innovation reaction function of the Firms in the pure and mixed oligopolies. 
When compared to the reaction function of Firm C in the pure oligopoly ( (2) C RF ), the reaction function of 
the co-op (
'
(2) C RF ) is shifted outwards and rotated rightwards. The co-op has increased incentives to 
innovate because, by seeking to maximize member welfare, it is better able to internalize the cost and 
benefits associated with its investment on innovation.  
  At the same time, the cooperative involvement reduces the marginal profitability of the IOF’s 
investment on innovation by reducing the equilibrium food product prices. Graphically, the involvement 
of the co-op results in the reaction function of Firm I (the IOF in both the mixed and pure oligopolies) 
shifting inwards in rightward rotation. These changes in the reaction functions result in increased 
innovation by the co-op relative to Firm C in the pure duopoly and reduced innovation by Firm I in the 
mixed oligopoly case, i.e.,  
'* ' * (61)       and   CC II tt tt ><  
Regarding the total quality-enhancing product innovation activity, it can be shown that the effect 
of cooperative involvement depends on the size of innovation costs and the degree of consumer 
heterogeneity. In particular, when 0.701444 μψ >  total innovation in the mixed oligopoly exceeds that in 
the pure duopoly. Formally: 
'* (62)     ( )0.701444 ( )   tt μψ ΤΤ ≥< = > ≥<  
    18
As pointed out by G&F, innovation activity in the mixed oligopoly does not always exceed that in 
the pure oligopoly because the co-op can only partially internalize the cost and benefits associated with its 
innovation activity. Recall that, when the co-op determines its innovation effort, it is only concerned with 
the welfare of its pre-innovation membership (i.e., it does not consider the effect of its choices on the rest 
of the consumers).  
  Equation (62) indicates that the greater the innovation costs and/or the great the consumer 
heterogeneity, the more likely it is that the mixed oligopoly will result in higher total innovation than the 
pure oligopoly. The increased likelihood that total innovation is greater in the mixed oligopoly under 
higher innovation costs is the direct outcome of the co-op explicitly considering the effects of innovation 
activity to (at least some) consumers. 
  In terms of the effect of the degree of consumer heterogeneity on the total innovation undertaken 
under the pure and mixed oligopolies, the argument is slightly different. Due to the symmetry of the firms 
in the pure oligopoly, the degree of consumer heterogeneity does not affect the amount of total innovation 
in this market structure. This is not the case in the mixed oligopoly, however, since μ affects the 
innovation effort of both the co-op and the IOF. As pointed out by G&F, a high value of μ allows the co-
op to increase its earnings in stage 1 (used to finance its innovation activity in stage 2) without drastically 
reducing the size of its pre-innovation membership. At the same time, a high value of μ provides the IOF 
with incentives to increase its innovation effort since, under increased consumer heterogeneity, this firm 
can increase its price (and profits) at the post-innovation stage of the game. Thus, as consumer 
heterogeneity increases, so does total innovation in the mixed oligopoly. 
  Consider now the effect of cooperative involvement on prices. It is important to note that the 
effect of cooperative involvement on prices in the pre-innovation stage also determines the effect of 
cooperative involvement on consumer welfare. This is not the case in the post-innovation stage, however, 
since it is the effect of co-op on prices but also on the amount of quality-enhancing innovation that 
determines the welfare effects of cooperative involvement.    19
Figure 4 graphs the pre-innovation price reaction functions in the pure and mixed oligopolies and 
illustrates the changes in equilibrium prices caused by the presence of the member welfare maximizing 
co-op. When compared to Firm C in the pure oligopoly, the co-op’s reaction function (
'
(1) C RF ) is shifted 
inwards in leftward rotation. At the same price, the presence of the co-op causes the reaction function of 
Firm I (IOF in both the pure and mixed oligopolies) to shift outwards in rightward rotation. The result is 
that both Firms in the mixed oligopoly charge lower prices than the IOFs in the pure duopoly. Since both 
prices are reduced in the mixed oligopoly, all consumers, members and non-members of the co-op, 
benefit from the presence of the co-op in the pre-innovation stage of the game. It is important to note that 
this result holds irrespectively of the degree of consumer heterogeneity and the size of innovation costs.  
Similar to the pre-innovation stage, in the post-innovation stage both Firms in the mixed duopoly 
will charge lower prices than their IOF counterparts in the pure oligopoly. Even though Firm I will invest 
less in innovation when it competes with a co-op, 
'' * *
(3) (3) II II tp tp −> − ∀ μψ. This is important since it 
implies that the utility associated with the consumption of the product of Firm I is always higher in the 
mixed duopoly. Regarding Firm C, since 
'*
CC tt >  and
'*
(3) (3) CC p p < , 
'' * *
(3) (3) CC CC tp tp −> − indicating that 
the utility associated with the consumption of co-op’s product is higher than the utility derived from the 
product of Firm C in the pure oligopoly. Thus, similar to the pre-innovation stage, the presence of the co-
op benefits all consumers, members and non-members of the co-op, and this result is independent of μ and 
ψ. The effect of cooperative involvement on the welfare of consumers in the post-innovation stage is 
shown in Figure 5.  
For completeness of exposition, consider next the ramifications of cooperative involvement when 
0.625 μψ < and the co-op becomes a monopolist at the post-innovation stage of the game (Table 3). 
Relative to the pure oligopoly, total innovation falls in this case because, even though the co-op innovates 
more than each individual IOF in the pure oligopoly, its innovation effort is less than the aggregate of 
these IOFs. Thus, when  0.625 μψ < the presence of the co-op induces exit of Firm I and results in 
reduced quality-enhancing innovation activity.   20
  In terms of pre-innovation prices, both firms charge lower prices in the mixed oligopoly than their 
counterparts in the pure oligopoly indicating that the presence of the co-op benefits all consumers at the pre-
innovation stage of the game. This is also true for the post-innovation stage since 
'' * *
(3) (3) CC CC tp tp −> − and 
'' * *
(3) (3) CC II tp tp μ −> + − . Thus, even though the presence of the co-op reduces total innovation when 
0.625 μψ < , the price effect is such that the utility associated with the consumption of the co-op’s product is 
greater than the utilities associated with the consumption of the products supplied by the two IOFs in the 
pure oligopoly. Figure 6 depicts both the dominance of the co-op in the post-innovation stage and the 
consumer benefits from its presence. 
Overall, the analysis in this section reveals that even though the cooperative involvement in 
quality-enhancing innovation in markets for horizontally differentiated products does not always result in 
increased innovation activity, it does cause an unambiguous increase in the welfare of all consumers, 
members and non-members of the co-op. Note that the reduced price-cost margins in the mixed oligopoly 
indicate that the co-operative involvement in product innovation enhances competition and, thus, it 
enhances total economic welfare in this market. These findings are consistent with the results of G&F on 
the effects of the involvement of input-supplying co-ops in process innovation activity.  
While both the consumer co-op considered in this study and the input-supplying co-op examined 
in G&F constitute a backward integration of their members (i.e., they are formed by groups that are part 
of the demand side of these co-ops (consumers in the case of the consumer co-op and agricultural 
producers in the case of the input supplying co-op)), the nature of the innovation activity considered in the 
two cases is different. An important implication of this is that when considering the effect of cooperative 
involvement in markets for horizontally differentiated products, the nature of innovation activity does not 
matter. No matter if it is cost-reducing process innovation or quality-enhancing product innovation, the 
involvement of cooperatives that are a backward integration of their members can increase the innovation 
activity in the market, is welfare enhancing and, thus, socially desirable.   
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4. Vertical Product Differentiation: Co-op is the High Quality Firm 
 
After analyzing the effect of cooperative involvement in product innovation activity in markets for 
horizontally differentiated products, we turn our attention to markets for vertically differentiated products. 
In particular, adopting the same game-theoretic structure and (relevant) assumptions, we seek to 
determine the effect of cooperative involvement in quality-enhancing innovation in markets for products 
that are uniformly quality ranked by consumers.  
To begin, consider first the case where the products of the two firms are vertically differentiated 
with the product supplied by Firm C (co-op in the mixed oligopoly) being the high quality product. 
Before deriving the subgame perfect equilibria in the pure and mixed oligopolies, we need to derive the 
consumer demands at the pre- and post-innovations stages of the game. 
 
4.1 Consumer Decisions and Welfare  
Consumer Decisions in Stage 1 
Similar to the case of horizontal product differentiation, consumers have the choice between the products 
of Firm I and Firm C and the purchasing decision represents a small share of their budget. Consumers 
consume one unit of a product and, even though they uniformly quality rank the two products, they differ 
in their valuation of the perceived quality differences. To capture these elements, consumer utility is now: 
 (63)  μα + − = ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( C C p U U     If a unit of Firm C’s product is consumed 
μα − − = ) ( I ) ( I p U U 1 1 1     If a unit of Firm I’s product is consumed 
where all variables are as previously defined. Note that if  (1) (1) CI p p = ,  ) ( I ) ( C U U 1 1 ≥  ∀α and all 
consumers will buy the product of Firm C. For different prices, the consumer with differentiating attribute 
) ( I 1 α  where: 
(1) (1) (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
(1) (1)
(1)
(64)     α :
           α
2
IC I C I
CI
I








is indifferent between the two products and determines the demands faced by Firm I,  ) ( I ) ( I x 1 1 α = , and    22
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Once again, if (1) (1) CI p p = , all consumers will buy the high quality product (i.e.,  (1) 1 C x =  and  (1) 0 I x = ).  
 
Consumer Decisions in Stage 3 
The utility function at the post-innovation stage (i.e., after the quality enhancing product innovation) is:  
(67)  C C C t p U U + + − = μα ) 3 ( 1 ) 3 (     If a unit of Firm C’s product is consumed 
I ) ( I ) ( I t p U U + − − = μα 3 1 3     If a unit of Firm I’s product is consumed 
where all variables are as previously defined. Following the same procedure established earlier, we derive 
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4.2. Benchmark Case: Innovation and Pricing Decisions in a Pure Oligopoly 
To determine the effect of cooperative involvement in innovation activity in a vertically differentiated 
market where the co-op is perceived as the high quality firm, we need to first analyze the benchmark case 
of the pure oligopoly with Firm C being the high quality firm. 
Since the only thing that varies from our previous analysis is the nature of product differentiation, 
we will omit the derivations and will only present the equilibrium conditions at the different stages of the 
game. The subgame perfect equilibrium in the pure duopoly is presented in Table 4. Unlike the horizontal 
product differentiation case, the pure oligopoly equilibrium in this vertical product differentiation case is 
not symmetric. In particular, the high quality IOF charges higher prices in both the pre- and post-
innovation stages of the game, enjoys greater market shares, and invests more in quality-enhancing  
innovation than its low quality counterpart.   23
4.3.  Innovation and Pricing Decisions in a Mixed Oligopoly 
Table 5 presents the subgame perfect equilibrium for the case where the high quality Firm C of the pure 
oligopoly is replaced by a high quality, member welfare maximizing, open membership co-op. A very 
important result here is that the presence of the high quality co-op results in the low quality IOF not 
investing in quality-enhancing product innovation and exiting the market at the post-innovation stage of 
the game. At the pre-innovation stage, the co-op will charge a higher price than the IOF due to its need to 
raise capital for its subsequent innovation activity. Despite it charging a higher price, the superior quality 
of its product enables the co-op to enjoy a higher market share than the IOF. 
  
4.4.  The Effect of Cooperative Involvement on Innovation Activity 
Having determined the subgame perfect equilibrium conditions in the pure and mixed oligopolies, we can 
now examine the effect of cooperative involvement in vertically differentiated markets when the co-op is 
the high quality firm. In terms of innovation activity, not only does the co-op innovate more than each 
individual IOF in the pure duopoly, its innovation activity exceeds the aggregate of the pure oligopolists. 
Therefore, the presence of a high quality co-op increases the quality-enhancing innovation in a vertically 
differentiated product market. 
  In terms of pre-innovation prices, both the co-op and the IOF charge lower prices than their IOF 
counterparts in the pure duopoly. In addition, the co-op charges lower post-innovation prices than both 
IOFs in the pure oligopoly which, combined with its increased innovation effort, implies that 
'' * *
(3) (3) CC CC tp tp −> − and 
'' * *
(3) (3) CC II tp tp −> − . The presence of the co-op is, therefore, consumer 
welfare enhancing in both the pre- and post-innovation stages of the game.  
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5. Vertical Product Differentiation: Co-op is the Low Quality Firm 
 
5.1. Consumer Decisions and Welfare 
Consider finally the case where Firm C (the co-op in the mixed oligopoly) is the low quality firm in a 
vertically differentiated product market. The demands faced by Firm I and Firm C at the pre-innovation 
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5.2. Benchmark Case: Innovation and Pricing Decisions in a Pure Oligopoly 
Table 6 presents the subgame perfect equilibrium in the pure duopoly when Firm C is the low quality 
firm. Note that Table 6 is analogous to Table 4 with the identities of the high and low quality IOFs being 
switched. Thus, similar to the case where Firm C was the high quality firm, the high quality IOF charges 
higher prices in both the pre- and post-innovation stage of the game, enjoys greater market shares, and 
undertakes higher innovation effort than the low quality IOF. 
 
5.3. Innovation and Pricing Decisions in a Mixed Oligopoly 
Table 7 presents the subgame perfect equilibrium conditions when the low quality Firm C is a co-op 
instead of an IOF. In this case, the low quality co-op charges lower prices and has lower market shares 
than the high quality IOF in both the pre- and post-innovation stages. Regarding innovation, like all other 
cases of vertical product differentiation examined in this paper, the high quality firm (IOF in this case) 
innovates more than the low quality one (co-op in this case).   25
  It is important to note that, for relatively low innovation costs and/or low degree of consumer 
heterogeneity (i.e., for 0.5 μψ < ), the co-op will exit the market in stage 3 (and will not invest in 
innovation in stage 2). Table 8 summarizes the subgame perfect equilibrium for this case. Not needing to 
raise capital for innovation activity, the co-op prices at marginal cost at the pre-innovation stage and splits 
the market with the high quality IOF. 
 
5.4.  The Effect of Cooperative Involvement on Innovation Activity 
Comparing the subgame perfect equilibrium conditions in the pure and mixed oligopolies, we can 
determine the effect of cooperative involvement in vertically differentiated markets when the co-op is the 
low quality firm. In terms of innovation, the presence of the co-op increases the profitability of 
investment in innovation for the high quality Firm I and, consequently, this firm innovates more in the 
mixed oligopoly case. Even though the low quality co-op innovates more than its IOF counterpart in the 
pure oligopoly only when 0.6 μψ >  (and does not innovate at all when  0.5 μψ < ), total innovation is 
always higher in the mixed oligopoly, i.e., the presence of the low quality co-op increases the quality-
enhancing innovation activity in a vertically differentiated product market. 
In terms of pre-innovation prices, both the co-op and the IOF charge lower prices than their IOF 
counterparts in the pure duopoly, while, in the post innovation stage of the game, it always holds that 
'' * *
(3) (3) II II tp tp −> − and 
'' * *
(3) (3) CC CC tp tp −> − (
'' **
(3) (3) II CC tp tp −> − when  0.5 μψ < ). Therefore, the 
presence of the co-op is welfare enhancing in both the pre- and post-innovation stages of the game.  
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper developed a sequential game-theoretic model of heterogeneous consumers to analyze the 
market and welfare effects of cooperative involvement in quality-enhancing, product innovation activity. 
The open membership cooperative considered in our analysis seeks to maximize the welfare of its 
members and addresses its property rights problems by financing its investment activity through retained 
earnings.    26
  The effect of cooperative involvement in quality-enhancing innovation activity was considered in 
the context of three differentiated product market settings: a horizontally differentiated product market, a 
vertically differentiated product market with the co-op being the high quality firm, and a vertically 
differentiated product market with the co-op being the low quality firm. 
Analytical results show that, in all cases, cooperative involvement in quality-enhancing product 
innovation is welfare enhancing – the presence of the member welfare maximizing co-op is shown to 
result in reduced food prices and welfare gains for all consumers, members and non-members of the co-
op. In terms of innovation, while the presence of the co-op in vertically differentiated product markets 
results in increased quality-enhancing innovation activity no matter if the co-op is a high or a low quality 
firm, the effect of the cooperative on the innovation effort in horizontally differentiated product markets 
depends on the degree of consumer heterogeneity and the size of the innovation costs. Thus, while the 
nature of product differentiation does not affect the welfare effects of cooperatives, it can influence their 
effect on total product innovation activity in the market.  
Before concluding this paper, it should be pointed out that our findings on the effect of 
cooperative involvement in product innovation activity in markets for horizontally differentiated products 
are consistent with the results of G&F on the effects of the involvement of input-supplying co-ops in 
process innovation activity when the agricultural inputs are horizontally differentiated. While both the 
consumer co-op considered in this study and the input-supplying co-op examined in G&F constitute a 
backward integration of their members (i.e., they are formed by groups that are part of the demand side of 
these co-ops), the nature of the innovation activity considered in the two cases is different. An important 
implication of this is that when considering the effect of cooperative involvement in markets for 
horizontally differentiated products, the nature of innovation activity does not matter. No matter if it is 
cost-reducing process innovation or quality-enhancing product innovation, the involvement of 
cooperatives that are a backward integration of their members can increase the innovation activity in the 
market, is welfare enhancing and, thus, socially desirable.   
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Figure 1.  Consumer decisions and welfare at the pre-innovation stage 
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Figure 2.  Consumer decisions and welfare at the post-innovation stage 
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Figure 4. Effect of Cooperative Involvement on Pre-Innovation Prices 
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Figure 6. Market and Welfare Effects of Cooperative Involvement when Co-op is a Monopolist at the 
Post-Innovation Stage  
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Table 1.   Horizontal Product Differentiation: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Pure Oligopoly 
Pre-innovation Stage (Stage 1)  (1) i p   c μ +  
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Table 2.   Horizontal Product Differentiation: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Mixed Oligopoly    
   ( 0.625 μψ > ) 
































(1) I x  
22 84 3
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Table 3.  Horizontal Product Differentiation: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Mixed  
Oligopoly ( 0.625 μψ < ) 
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Table 4.   Vertical Product Differentiation with Firm C being the High Quality Firm:  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Pure Oligopoly. 
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Table 5.  Vertical Product Differentiation with the Co-op being the High Quality Firm:  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Mixed Oligopoly. 
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Table 6.  Vertical Product Differentiation with Firm C being the Low Quality Firm:  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Pure Oligopoly. 
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Table 7.  Vertical Product Differentiation with the Co-op being the Low Quality Firm:  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Mixed Oligopoly ( 0.5 μψ > ). 
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Table 8.  Vertical Product Differentiation with Co-op being the Low Quality Firm:  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Mixed Oligopoly ( 0.5 μψ < ). 
Pre-innovation Stage (Stage 1)  (1) C p   c  
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